This paper studies an equilibrium model between an insurance buyer and an insurance seller, where both parties' risk preferences are given by convex risk measures. The interaction is modeled through a Stackelberg type game, where the insurance seller plays rst by oering prices, in the form of safety loadings. Then the insurance buyer chooses his optimal proportional insurance share and his optimal prevention eort in order to minimize his risk measure. The loss distribution is given by a family of stochastically ordered probability measures, indexed by the prevention eort. We give special attention to the problems of self-insurance and self-protection. We prove that the formulated game admits a unique equilibrium, that we can explicitly solve by further specifying the agents criteria and the loss distribution. In self-insurance, we consider also an adverse selection setting, where the type of the insurance buyers is given by his loss probability, and study the screening and shutdown contracts. Finally, we provide case studies in which we explicitly apply our theoretical results.