Media Moral Hazard in Supplementary Health Insurance: Modelling of the Insured's Behaviour and the Optimal

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Moral Hazard in Supplementary Health Insurance: Modelling of the Insured's Behaviour and the Optimal

uploaded May 12, 2020 Views: 324 Comments: 0 Favorite: 1 CPD
International Actuarial Association International Actuarial Association
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Description:

This presentation focuses on the problem of moral hazard in health insurance. We introduce our solution by explaining how we have modelled the behaviour of supplementary health insurance policyholders within a context of moral hazard and build an Optimal Contract Resolution Algorithm. The algorithm provides an innovative approach to insurance companies wishing to develop competitive and sustainable insurance products.

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Categories: ASTIN / NON-LIFE
Content groups:  content2020

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